So how ‘routine’ is it for
military drills to take place in highly populated, dense metropolitan
neighborhoods that includes simulated gunfire and strafing runs, troops
rappelling out of helicopters, building breaching for practice amidst assorted
flares and smoke bombs? Although the
Posse Comitatus Act of
1878 prohibits military forces from acting as civilian
law enforcement on American soil, similar full-scale military exercises, known
as Operation Urban
Shield (OUS), continue to occur
in many of the country’s largest
municipal areas including Miami,
Houston,
San
Francisco, Los
Angeles, and Boston
and have irreparably damaged the Act’s
legal authority.
While OUS exercises are
conducted by ”military
personnel, designed to ensure the military’s ability to operate in urban
environments,” its roots can be traced to Presidential Policy Directive #8. entitled “National
Preparedness.” The Directive provided the framework to
create the Urban Security Areas Initiative (USAI)
dedicated to “support for high-threat, high-density
urban areas to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from threats
or acts of terrorism.” As an agency within FEMA
(Federal Emergency Management Agency), USAI is funded
by the Department of Homeland
Security.
The City of Boston’s
earlier Urban Shield drills, one in May,
2011 and another in November,
2012, offer an ideal opportunity to consider how well the program functioned during a true-life
emergency ‘situation,’ whether it is a valuable tool in terrorist situations
and whether anything of significance has been accomplished to justify the
dismantling of the nation’s once-sacrosanct civil liberties. Such scrutiny is not intended to be critical
of the officers and emergency personnel who were diligent in their efforts to
protect the greater population of Boston. We now know it was the Massachusetts Emergency
Management Agency (MEMA)
that issued the ‘shelter-in-place’ order on April 19th. Utilizing a high-tech ‘wireless
emergency area’ message system, described as ‘phone sirens”, MEMA sent a
media advisory announcing the upcoming house-to- house search as part of the
ensuing tracking operation.
To reiterate from my
two previous posts (here
and here) these are the facts as we know them: a wounded 19 year old, who turned out to be
unarmed, eluded a massive dragnet for almost twenty four hours, mostly in broad
daylight, until he was discovered by an observant neighbor who spotted drops of
blood. In other words, a massive 9,000
member dragnet with every technological advantage at its fingertips was unable
to track an amateur-terrorist who had no after-plan or escape route to
follow. What gives with that?
Not surprisingly, our
well-funded intel agencies appear to have been caught flat-footed by not more
closely following up on earlier alerts from the Russian government warning
about Tamerlan Dzhokhar - although details about the nature of the relationship
of those agencies with the older brother are still ambiguous. While authorities remain tight-lipped about
the details of the Thursday night shoot-out that killed Tamerlan, it would be
essential to know if Urban Shield recommends a ‘no kill’ order or use of a
sophisticated laser stun-gun to subdue a critically-valuable suspect. If so, we might have considerably more relevant
information than we have today.
Since there was no way
for OUS to predict the bombing, the inescapable conclusion is that such
full-scale military trainings are of limited use after a ‘situation’ has occurred, therefore, leaving open the
question of why military training needs to take place in urban areas and where
and when will such training be necessary.
The argument that Urban Shield will prevent a future attack neglects the
reality that OUS was not directly responsible for the capture of the suspect. More to the point, the intel game plan that asserts
Operation Urban Shield strategic value has apparently failed to calculate the
inherent complexity of conducting a house-to-house search and a massive dragnet
within the tight confines of a densely crowded urban neighborhood.
Despite the advantages of Federal government
largesse of unlimited funding and manpower
and an enormous bureaucracy, there remains a fundamental question of
whether any amount of money, training or preparation can defend against or
anticipate a lone-wolf, homegrown kind of attack – and at what cost to the Bill
of Rights.